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8.1 Introduction 
 
Non pecuniary losses can be characterized as losses that are suffered by damaging 
goods or interests which have in themselves no economic price or value on a financial 
market. Examples are damage to goods with a primarily sentimental value, such as an 
album of wedding photos, pain and suffering as a result of physical injury, damage to 
personal reputation, or even the death of a person. Due to the fact that these goods or 
interests have no substantial or direct market value, non pecuniary losses are often 
characterized as losses that cannot be undone with money. Rogers (2001, p. 246) de-
fines non pecuniary losses as “losses which are not damage to a person’s assets or 
wealth or income and which is are therefore incapable of being quantified in objective 
financial manner by reference to a market”. Tort law, however, generally recognizes non 
pecuniary losses to some extent as losses that should be compensated with money. 
 
The paradox described above gives rise to several questions that have attracted atten-
tion in the field of law and economics. To address these questions we will first pay atten-
tion to some aspects of tort law and economics in general (Section 8.2). Then we will 
deal with visions on the question of why non pecuniary losses should be compensated 
(Section 8.3), with aspects of valuation of non pecuniary losses (Section 8.4) and with 
risks of high awards (Section 8.5). In Section 8.6 we will come to conclusions. 
 
As a preliminary remark, it should be noted that most of the literature on law and eco-
nomics that is relevant for the issue of non pecuniary losses, is not strictly limited to this 
type of loss. Authors often, for instance, pay attention to physical injury in general, which 
may include financial losses as a result of this injury. Likewise, the aspect of prevention 
of accidents is usually discussed with regard to all costs of accidents, thus not limited to 
non pecuniary losses. For this reason the scope of this overview [216] is not strictly lim-
ited to law and economics literature on non pecuniary losses. A first conclusion may be 
that there are in fact very few authors who isolate questions that consider economic as-
pects of non pecuniary losses as such (exceptions are Adams, 1989; Croley and Han-
son, 1995; Faure, 2000). 
 
 
8.2 Tort law and economics 
 
To consider the economic aspects of non pecuniary losses, the broader perspective of 
economic aspects of tort law in general must be taken into account. 
 
Economic theory analyzes legal rules on the basis of efficiency, which generally means 
maximizing total benefit and minimizing total cost. The founding fathers of economic 
theories of law, Ronald Coase and Guido Calabresi, have, independent of each other, 
greatly contributed to the law and economics approach (Landes and Posner, 1981, pp. 
852-864). 
 
Coase developed the theorem that given the conditions of rationally behaving actors, 
perfect information and zero transaction costs, an optimal allocation of resources will al-
ways be reached, irrespective of the legal system (Coase, 1960). The Coase theorem 
can also be applied to torts. If parties could negotiate under the above mentioned condi-
  
  
3 
tions, they could reach an optimal level of precaution at which the total cost of accidents 
is minimized. However, since we do not live in such a reality, the optimal allocation is not 
automatically reached. Yet, the Coase theorem can be helpful in identifying the optimal 
allocation of resources. Then tort law comes into play. In a world with transaction costs 
and other imperfections, tort law is necessary to determine people’s rights and to influ-
ence people’s behavior such that an optimal allocation is reached (Cooter and Ulen, 
2004, pp. 95-98) and the total expected costs of accidents are minimized. Note, how-
ever, that the studies of Dewees, Duff and Trebilcok (1996) doubt the influence of tort 
law on behavior. In a slightly different setting Landes and Posner (1981) state that – al-
though judges might not act consciously – common law is best explained as if judges are 
trying to maximize efficiency. 
 
Calabresi identified two principal goals of tort law: it should be fair and it should reduce 
the costs of accidents. Calabresi mentions fairness as the most important objective of 
tort law. This is, however, not an independent objective in an economic sense. That is 
why Calabresi considers fairness rather as a constraint on measures to lower costs 
(Calabresi, 1970, p. 25). Calabresi’s most important contribution to the economic ap-
proach of tort law is the division of total costs of accidents in three categories: primary, 
secondary and tertiary costs. Primary costs are the costs of the accidents themselves 
and can be reduced by lowering the number and severity of [217] accidents. Secondary 
costs are the costs due to an inefficient distribution of the losses over the population and 
can be reduced by spreading the risk of accidents or by averting the risks to people that 
“are best able to pay, […], regardless of whether this involves spreading” (Calabresi, 
1970, p. 21). This leads to the demand for insurance against losses. Tertiary costs are 
the costs of administering the treatment of accidents and are, in fact, made to reduce 
primary and secondary accident costs. 
 
Non pecuniary losses can be related to both theories. By recognizing these losses, they 
can be seen as (primary) costs of accidents. Allocating the burden of compensation of 
non pecuniary losses provides these losses with a role in spreading the risks of acci-
dents. A preliminary question is, however, why non pecuniary losses should be recog-
nized as compensable losses. 
 
 
8.3 Why should non pecuniary losses be compensated? 
 
8.3.1 Why compensation?  
 
Compensation of non pecuniary losses is – to varying extents – recognized in at least all 
Western jurisdictions (Rogers, 2001). Non pecuniary losses are also considered to form 
an important aspect of tort liability (for an explanation of this: see Comandé, 2005, p. 
250-255, who states that an increase in resources in a society enhances the recognition 
and protection by law of “new” personal interests. Compensation of non pecuniary 
losses can be seen as a relatively new personal interest). Viscusi (1991, p. 102) uses an 
International Organisation for Standarization (ISO) data set to show that the share of the 
award paid for non pecuniary losses in 1977 ranges between 30 percent and 57 percent 
of the total awards paid. A study by Towers Perrin Tillinghast (2003, p. 17) shows that in 
2001 the shares of tort costs that went to pecuniary and non pecuniary losses were 
equal. But not only empirical data show the importance of the topic, the quantity of stud-
ies and criticism already indicates its importance. 
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The paradox presented earlier of the monetary compensation for losses that have no 
financial origin gives, at least from an economic point of view, rise to the fundamental 
question as to why this type of loss should be compensated at all. At this point different 
aims can be recognized. From an economic point of view usually the aim of prevention is 
put forward as the main reason to award compensation for non pecuniary loss. From a 
more traditional legal point of view, usually compensation of the victim and vindication of 
his rights as such are seen as the main objectives of the compensation of non pecuniary 
loss. 
 
In order to explore the economic relevance of non pecuniary losses they are often re-
lated to the demand for insurance. Given that non pecuniary [218] losses cannot be un-
done with money ex post, the conclusion is drawn that these losses do not generate a 
demand for insurance ex ante. It would be to no avail to insure oneself and pay premi-
ums, if the (ex post) cash benefit does not lead to a higher utility level (Adams, 1989, pp. 
215-216). Support for this opinion is said to be found in the absence of demand for in-
surance against non pecuniary losses. Yet, although by definition non pecuniary losses 
cannot be undone with money, these losses are considered to be compensable with 
money. Therefore, the statement that non pecuniary losses do not generate an extra 
demand for money after an accident, is questionable. Croley and Hanson (1995) dis-
agree with this statement and try to make the apparent absence of demand for these 
insurances plausible with other explanations. There is no consensus on this point in lit-
erature, and empirical studies will have to answer this question (Faure, 2000, p. 158). 
 
There have been several empirical and theoretical studies with proposals to change the 
system or to withhold from awarding for non pecuniary losses at all (for an overview of 
some of these see Croley and Hanson, 1995, pp. 1787-93). However, from an economic 
point of view (partially) awarding for those losses is considered to be desirable to provide 
individuals with the right incentives for their behavior (Adams, 1989).  
 
8.3.2 Prevention 
 
In an economically perfect society, individuals know exactly the benefits and costs of 
every action they are going to undertake. They will weigh up carefully wether the in-
tended action is beneficial for their utility and act according to this deliberation (Shavell, 
1980). Tort law could prevent accidents, or at least enforce precautionary measures, us-
ing this line of reasoning. Individuals that have to compensate for losses they cause, will 
weigh these losses against the benefits the intended action brings. Consequently they 
will make a decision on whether or not to undertake the action and, if undertaken, how 
many precautionary measures are to be taken. 
 
To make the outcome of the individual deliberation the socially desirable one, all costs of 
accidents should be charged to those who could avoid them by taking precautionary 
measures (Adams, 1989, p. 213). An individual faced with all the costs and benefits of its 
action, will make an optimal decision for himself and consequently (as Adam Smith al-
ready stated with his ‘Invisible Hand-theory’) for society as a whole. As non pecuniary 
losses are real losses for the victims, these costs should for deterrence purposes be fully 
compensated as well (Adams, 1989, p. 213). However, charging total accident costs to 
injurers does not automatically mean that injurers incur total accident costs. Income 
taxes make that injurers only incur a certain (tax rate-dependent) percentage of the total 
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accident costs. This [219] means that injurers do not include total accident costs in their 
deliberations before undertaking preventive measures. A less than 100 percent likeli-
hood of a successful claim has the same distorting influence (Shavell, 2004, pp. 274-5). 
Injurers do not incur total accident costs, but only expected costs, which are a percent-
age (dependent on the likelihood of a successful claim) of total accident costs.  
 
It is argued that compensating victims for total accident costs should only take place in 
certain accident situations. Unilateral accidents should be distinguished from bilateral 
accidents (for example. Shavell, 1980, Shavell, 1987; Adams, 1989). Unilateral acci-
dents are accidents in which the victim itself cannot do anything to avoid the accident. 
Bilateral accidents are accidents for which both the victim and the injurer can take 
measures to avoid them. This distinction is decisive for the (share of the) losses that 
should be charged to the injurer.  
 
In unilateral accidents all losses (non pecuniary and pecuniary) should be charged to the 
injurer, for he is the only one that can take precautionary measures to avoid the acci-
dent. If he would not have to compensate for all the losses he causes, he will take too 
few precautionary measures from a social point of view (Adams, 1989, p. 214). 
 
In case of bilateral accidents the situation is different. As stated, both parties involved in 
the accident can take precautionary measures to avoid it. To force the injurer to take 
precautionary measures, he should be charged the losses he causes. However, if the 
victim is compensated fully for the accident (as in the unilateral situation), he is - from an 
economic point of view - indifferent between the situation in which he gets involved in an 
accident or and one where he does not. As a result, a victim will not take the precautions 
he would have taken in the case where he would not be compensated for the losses he 
suffers (Shavell, 1987, p. 247-254).  
 
Many jurisdictions use one of the systems of contributory or comparative negligence de-
fense in deciding on the amount of compensation. These systems will enforce some 
precautionary measures by the victim. However, there might be many other precaution-
ary measures that do not affect his liability position and which are therefore not enforced 
by this system (Posner, 2007). Consequently a victim will not take these measures. In 
contrast, Van Randow (1988, p. 219) thinks that this fault position is enough to enforce 
all the precautionary measures. Cooter and Ulen (2004, p. 337) mention the problems of 
proving negligence. This will make potential injurers act with fewer precaution. Shavell 
(1987, p. 79-83) shows how errors by judges can influence the precautionary measures 
potential injurers and victims take. 
 
Hence, on the one hand, the injurer should be charged with all the losses he causes to 
provide him with the right prevention incentives. On the [220] other hand, the victim 
should not always be compensated fully in order to provide him with the right prevention 
incentives. How much the victim should be compensated depends on which of the two 
parties is better able to take precautionary measures (Calabresi, 1970, p. 135). 
 
A possible solution for this conflict of interests is to make the injurer pay a fine to a third 
party. Then all costs of the accident are charged to the injurer and the victim is not com-
pensated fully, so that he will take precautionary measures as well (Shavell, 2004, pp. 
272-5).  
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Calabresi denominates the mechanism of prevention described in this paragraph, by 
which all accident costs are internalized and individuals decide individually on the 
amount of precaution to take, general deterrence (Calabresi, 1970, p. 68). This in con-
trast to specific deterrence, where a political process leads to regulation of dangerous 
behaviour (Calabresi, 1970, p. 95). This is of course the well-known standard setting 
trough safety regulation; the literature has developed criteria to indicate under which cir-
cumstances safety regulation may be better suited than liability rules in order to provide 
optimal deterrence (Shavell, 1984a, 1984b). 
 
8.3.3 Efficient distribution and insurance 
 
Inevitably people will face pecuniary and non pecuniary losses in their lives. Not every-
body is equally able and willing to bear these losses. An efficient distribution of losses 
among the population is very important to reduce total accident costs. Calabresi expects 
that by taking measures in this field total accident costs ’can be reduced as significantly 
as by taking measures to avoid accidents in the first place’ (Calabresi, 1970, p. 27). 
  
An efficient way to distribute losses is insurance. The demand for insurance can be seen 
as a desire to distribute resources across different states of the world (Croley and Han-
son, 1995, p. 1822). People move resources from the non-accident state of the world to 
the accident state of the world. In this way all the insured cooperate to compensate vic-
tims for the losses that would result from a possible accident. Every individual can de-
cide exactly for how much he wants to insure for, in other words how much of the losses 
he will possibly face, he is willing to bear. Thus the losses will be distributed among so-
ciety in an efficient way. From this point of view, tort law should compensate a victim 
only for the suffered losses that he would have liked to insure himself for (Croley and 
Hanson, 1995, pp. 1797-98; Cook and Graham, 1977, pp. 10-14).  
 
With pecuniary losses this is not too problematic. Assuming risk aversion of individuals, 
it is likely that individuals will take out insurance coverage against pecuniary losses. Be-
sides this, the magnitude of pecuniary losses is relatively easily determined. Given that 
risk-averse individuals will insure themselves against pecuniary losses, the fact that 
these losses are [221] easy to determine and the fact that the preferences regarding 
these losses do not vary as much as those regarding non pecuniary losses, a law-based 
tort system could fulfill the role of individual insurances. Such a system will not cause as 
much inefficiency in the redistribution of resources among the population, as a law 
based tort system for non pecuniary losses would. However, Kaplow and Shavell (2002, 
p. 151) and Posner (2007) point out that a tort system is a much more expensive insur-
ance system than a system in which every individual insures himself.  
 
The situation is different for non pecuniary losses. Since non pecuniary losses are real 
losses, these losses lead to a decrease in utility. Besides this, non pecuniary losses also 
seem to influence the marginal utility of money an individual derives from money (Fried-
man, 1982, p. 82; Shavell, 2004, pp. 269-71). It is not too hard to imagine that the loss of 
a child would influence the pleasure of going on a holiday for a family or that the loss of 
a leg would influence the pleasure of going to a swimming pool. In principle a non pecu-
niary loss could increase or decrease the marginal utility of money. Empirical studies 
tend to show that the marginal utility decreases when faced with a loss of personal 
health (Viscusi and Evans, 1990).  
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However, authors disagree on the demand for insurance against non pecuniary losses. It 
should be noted that the relevance of the demand for insurance against non pecuniary 
losses is related to the aim of compensation of non pecuniary loss, because it is as-
sumed that this demand reveals something about the needs and perceptions of the vic-
tim. 
 
No demand for insurance 
Adams (1989) draws the conclusion that since, by definition, non pecuniary losses can-
not be undone with money, there will not exist extra demand for money after an accident 
that causes non pecuniary losses. As there is no demand for money ex post, the as-
sumption is that people will not insure themselves for non pecuniary losses ex ante. The 
payment of an insurance premium ex ante would lead to a decrease in utility for some-
thing that does not generate extra demand for money ex post.  
 
Moreover, if the marginal utility of money would be lower after an accident, this would 
lead to an inverse insurance desire. People would want to transfer money from the state 
of the world after the accident to the state of the world before the accident, since they 
enjoy money more there (Shavell, 1987, pp. 228-31).  
 
Suurmond and Van Velthoven (2005, p. 1935) develop an economic model that shows 
that – even if non pecuniary losses could be fully compensated – a risk averse individual 
would never insure himself against non pecuniary losses. 
 
Using this line of reasoning, applying tort law for compensating non pecuniary losses 
does not seem appropriate. Since there is no demand for insurance [222] of these 
losses ex ante, compensating for them would be inefficient. This would lead to an in-
crease in prices for everybody (the extra liability has to be charged somewhere), for 
something that nobody would want to insure himself for (Adams, pp. 216-17). 
 
A potential problem is the subjectivity of non pecuniary losses. Cook and Graham (1977, 
p. 144) state that non pecuniary losses can only be valued personally and that their 
valuation will change with one’s wealth. Schwartz (1998, p. 411) even speculates on the 
possibility that the size of non pecuniary losses might be determined partly by the tort 
system itself.  
 
As a consequence, even if non pecuniary losses were to generate demand for money, it 
is undesirable to use tort law for compensation. These losses are different for every indi-
vidual. This means that the prices would increase for everybody, whereas only those 
who experience large non pecuniary losses are compensated for this. Individual first-
party insurances would solve this problem (Priest, 1987, p. 1543). 
  
Support for the opinion that there is no demand for insurance against non pecuniary 
losses is said to be empirically based (for example, Shavell, 1987, p. 231). However, 
Zelizer (1981) tries to explain the demand for insurance on the death of a child. It might 
be true that insurances solely for non pecuniary losses rarely exist, but there do exist 
some integrated insurances that include a non pecuniary component. Empirical studies 
do not seem to provide unambiguous evidence. 
 
 
Demand for insurance 
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Schwartz (1998, p. 365) and Croley and Hanson (1995) disagree with the idea that there 
is no demand for insurance for non pecuniary losses. Croley and Hanson try to invali-
date extensively both theoretical and empirical evidence for the idea that there does not 
exist a demand for insurance.  
 
In deciding whether or not to take out an insurance, individuals try to equalize the mar-
ginal utility of money in the accident state of the world and the marginal utility in the non-
accident state of the world. If the marginal utilities in both states of the world would dif-
fered, people could make themselves better off by transferring money from one state of 
the world to another (by taking out more or less insurance). If it is assumed that a non 
pecuniary loss does not influence the marginal utility of money, the marginal utility in 
both states of the world is not affected by the non pecuniary loss and consequently will 
be no demand for insurance. As stated before, it is assumed that the marginal utility of 
money decreases after suffering a non pecuniary loss. This would mean that people will 
not take out insurance against non pecuniary losses and even that people will not fully 
insurance themselves against pecuniary losses. (Shavell, 1987, p. 230).  
 
[223] Croley and Hanson use another way of studying marginal utility. They state in ac-
cordance with for instance Schwartz (1988, p. 362) that marginal utility partly depends 
on an individual’s total level of utility, the so called baseline-utility. They postulate that 
baseline independent utility (the concept of utility referred to by Shavell) is appropriate 
for explaining choices within a certain state of the world. It is less reliable in predicting 
choices of individuals among different states of the world, each with its own utility level 
(Croley and Hanson, 1995, p. 1816).  
 
Croley and Hanson present the example of going to the opera: only one of two friends 
can go to the opera, while one of them is an opera lover and the other is not. Normally, it 
would be best to give the opera lover the ticket, since he derives more utility of the op-
era. However, if the other friend is in a bad mood, the opera might give him more pleas-
ure than it would give the opera lover. Taken into account the baseline utility, the mar-
ginal utilities of the friends might change with respect to each other (Croley and Hanson, 
1995, p. 1815).  
 
Inevitably, after an accident with non pecuniary losses an individual faces a new state of 
the world with a lower level of utility (Croley and Hanson, 1995, p. 1818). Given this, 
Croley and Hanson argue that is it plausible (in order to find support for this statement 
Croley and Hanson cite scholars as Rawls, Sen, Dworkin and Nagel) to assume that in-
dividuals aim for equalizing baseline utilities among the two states and maximizing total 
expected baseline-independent utility. In striving for this joint objective, individuals will 
demand partial insurance against non pecuniary losses (Croley and Hanson, 1995, pp. 
1816-20).  
 
Besides this, Croley and Hanson also state that empirical data show that individuals do 
demand insurance against non pecuniary losses and that these insurances in fact exist. 
Only due to a lack of information for instance it is difficult to offer these insurances on a 
large-scale basis. Tort law could play a role here to overcome some of these obstacles 
(Croley and Hanson, 1995, pp. 1896-917). 
 
 
8.4. Valuation of non pecuniary loss 
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The paradox that non pecuniary losses should be valuated in terms of money raises the 
fundamental question of valuation of this type of loss. 
 
Several studies consider the valuation of non pecuniary losses (for an overview see Vis-
cusi and Aldy, 2003). This valuation is often derived from the ‘willingness to pay’ ap-
proach (Viscusi and Aldy, 2003, p. 2). The approach uses the implicit tradeoff between 
money and risk in many market choices to value non pecuniary losses. This may be 
rather useful in cases of loss of, for instance, a family photo album, but it is more com-
plex when the approach attempts to value the loss of an arm or even loss of a life. 
 
[224] Viscusi (1998, pp. 660-61), however, presents some options to value the loss of a 
human life. He distinguishes three methods and shows that the method of valuation de-
pends on the economic objective of tort law. The first method is the compensation of the 
victim ex post, which seeks for the amount needed to compensate for the loss. This 
value approaches infinity. That is why the Value of a Statistical Life (VSL) is derived from 
decisions made by individuals. The VSL is the value that people attach to their lives ex 
ante. A widely used method is to look at the implicit tradeoff between the risk of death 
associated with the job and the wage in the choice of a job. Schelling (1968) introduced 
this method. Revesz (1999) stressed the difference between the risk of instantaneous 
death and latent harms that cause death later in a person’s lifetime. The VSL derived 
from data from the US labor market varies between $4 million and $9 million. Results 
from product markets and housing markets show similar results (Viscusi and Aldy, 2003, 
p. 4). The second method focuses on the amount needed for deterrence. This value is 
meant to set incentives for those who can take measures to avoid the accident. The third 
approach relates the value to the amount of insurance one would prefer. People try to 
equal marginal utilities before and after the accident. Since an accident changes the util-
ity function, it is likely that the preferred income after an accident will be different from 
the preferred income before an accident (Croley and Hanson, 1995, pp. 1797-804).  
 
The valuation of a human life, therefore, depends on the objective of tort law. Law eco-
nomics authors mostly concentrate on the second and third objective (Calabresi, 1970; 
Shavell, 1987; Adams, 1989; Faure, 2000), because they strive for maximizing total util-
ity of society. Their view is that compensation of the victim will only increase total utility 
of society if the victim enjoys a higher marginal utility of the transferred money than the 
injurer. People with a higher marginal utility of money usually are poorer people. So only 
if poor people would have a higher probability of becoming a victim in an accident than 
rich people, compensation would serve a utility increasing goal (Kaplow and Shavell, 
2002, p. 33).  
 
The concentration on deterrence and insurance as important viewpoint for the valuation 
of non pecuniary losses, differs substantially from the regular approach in tort law 
(Rogers, 2001), which usually concentrates on compensation of the victim ex post. It 
must be noted that loss of a human life can - as is shown above - not only be seen as a 
matter of non pecuniary loss, but also or even primarily, as a financial loss. 
 
 
8.5. Risks of high awards 
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The lack of a market price for non pecuniary losses and of other specific tools for valua-
tion creates the risk of high awards (Viscusi, 1991, pp. 99-101). The increase of awards 
for non pecuniary losses in federal [225] products liability lawsuits involving personal in-
jury in the United States is considered to have been an important cause of increase in of 
insurance premiums (American Law Institute, 1991, p. 199). The increase of awards also 
causes other economic effects, such as higher prices of consumer products and altering 
product innovation (for a broader overview, see Croley and Hanson, 1995, pp. 1787-8). 
These effects are considered to have caused a liability crisis. Recently a new increase of 
insurance premiums has been signaled. To keep the insurance market functioning, tort 
law is being reformed (Viscusi, 2003, pp. 1-2).  
 
An often proposed treatment is imposing caps on awards for non pecuniary damages. 
These caps are criticized by Viscusi. Rather than solely imposing caps, having stable 
and predictable awards for all categories of non pecuniary losses should be the objective 
(Viscusi, 2003, pp.10-11). Rubin and Shepherd (2007, p. 225) conclude that imposing 
caps does in fact lead to more predictable situations and therefore to a decrease in the 
amount of accidents (Rubin and Shepherd, 2007, p. 235). 
 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
In the literature non pecuniary losses are defined as losses that do not have a value on a 
financial market. For individuals that face non pecuniary losses, these losses are, how-
ever, real. Economic theory aims for efficiency. From this point of view tort law should 
minimize total accident costs. This should be done by decreasing primary and secondary 
accident costs as long as the decrease outweighs the increase in tertiary costs it causes. 
 
A decrease in primary costs is reached by prevention of accidents. In order to encourage 
precautionary measures, injurers should be charged all costs of the damage they cause. 
This means that they should also be charged the non pecuniary costs of the damage. 
However, if the victim is better able to take precautionary measures to prevent the acci-
dent than the injurer, the victim should not be fully compensated for the damage he has 
suffered. 
 
A decrease in secondary costs is reached by distributing the costs of accidents over so-
ciety in a way that those who are more willing to bear the costs do bear them. The value 
for which individuals insure themselves is a good way to identify the willingness to bear 
these costs. There is no consensus about the question of wether individuals demand 
insurance against non pecuniary losses. If they were to demand for such insurance at 
all, the valuation of non pecuniary losses is different for every individual. This implies 
that from an economic viewpoint, tort law is not appropriate to compensate for non pe-
cuniary losses. This would lead to a negative redistribution, in which everybody would 
pay the same increase in prices for awards that not everybody values equally.   
 
[226] The valuation of non pecuniary losses is subjective and therefore difficult. Various 
methods to value these losses have been developed, of which the ‘Value of a Statistical 
Life’ method is the one most often used. In spite of the methods available, the awards for 
non pecuniary losses are substantial and regarded as one of the main problems leading 
to the high insurance premiums in the United States. The search for a proper solution for 
these problems has not yet been completed.  
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